What was the need for an amendment of Insolvency and bankruptcy code (IBC) in India? Does the recent amendment supplement the real intent of IBC? Analyse.
Refer – The Hindu
IAS Parliament 7 years
KEY POINTS
Need for an amendment
· In the current form of IBC, there are no restrictions on who has to be a “Resolution applicant”.
· This gives an opportunity for the existing sponsors/promoters of corporate debtors (i.e. the company with debt and under the insolvency proceedings) to take part in the auctioning process.
· This actually merits the debtor to avail a resolution plan that entails substantial discount to outstanding loans of lenders.
· A promoter hoping to win back control at a steeper discount once his firm undergoes the bankruptcy process is less likely to cooperate with bankers in the lender’s forum for recovery using other debt restructuring mechanisms.
· This actually erodes the real intent of IBC: to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit, and balance the interests of all stakeholders.
Amendment to address shortcomings
· An amendment in the IBC makes certain persons ineligible to be a ‘resolution applicant.’
· Barred persons include: Wilful defaulters, NPA defaulter for 1year or more, those who execute an enforceable guarantee in respect of a corporate debtor.
· The Amendment Ordinance aims at putting in place safeguards to prevent unscrupulous, undesirable persons from regaining control of the defaulting company through the backdoor in the garb of a ‘resolution applicant.’
Does it supplement IBC?
· Though it seems helping in strengthen the formal economy and encourage honest businesses and budding entrepreneurs to work in a trustworthy, predictable regulatory environment, but it could in all likelihood lead to fewer bids and of lower value as it eliminates a potential bidder by default.
· Lower bids means banks will have to sacrifice more of the money they are owed and take larger losses, and the burden gets shifted ultimately to the taxpayer.
· It will affect the low demand sector too much.
· E.g. Thermal power assets are unlikely to get the same buying interest as steel gets.
· Apart from the big cases, there are dozens more mid-tier firms which are entering the resolution process and are unlikely to find as many bidders.
· Keeping out promoters may protect the government from accusations of crony capitalism but it is a body blow to banks seeking to extract the most paise out of every rupee of loans in default.
Umed Yadav 7 years
Please review.. Thanks
IAS Parliament 7 years