The recent terrorist encounter at Handwara (Kashmir) has once again brought to the fore the terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan.
Analysts of terrorism are well aware of the irony that Pakistan is both possibly the leading perpetrator and a major victim of terrorism.
What is the warfare that Pakistan has with its neighbours?
Strategy - This contradiction can be traced to the deliberate policy of the Pakistani state to create and foster terrorist groups in order to engage in low intensity warfare with its neighbours.
Pakistan first operationalized this strategy about Afghanistan following the overthrow of Zahir Shah by his cousin Daud Khan in 1973.
It intensified this strategy with the cooperation of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia after the Marxist coup of 1978.
Asset - The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left the Pakistani military with a large surplus of Islamist fighters that it had trained and armed.
Islamabad decided to use this “asset” to intensify the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley.
Decade-long Afghan “jihad” had also radicalised a substantial segment of the Pakistani population as well as augmented sectarian divisions only between Sunnis and Shias and also among various Sunni sects.
In the process, a number of homegrown terrorist groups emerged that the Pakistan Army co-opted for its use in Kashmir and the rest of India.
How did Pakistan’s strategy affect itself?
Some of Pakistan’s terrorist groups turned against it especially after the Musharraf government.
Musharraf’s government, under American pressure, decided to collaborate with the latter in the overthrow of Afghan Taliban regime.
But not all terrorist groups acted in this way.
What are the actions of LeT?
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group involved in the Handwara encounter, is a classic example of a “loyalist” terrorist organisation.
LeT has played by the rules set by the Pakistani military.
It only launches attacks on targets outside Pakistan, primarily in India.
Inter-Services Intelligence provides LeT with intelligence and logistical support in addition to identifying specific targets.
This is why the LeT and its front organisations have continued to receive the military’s patronage and support.
Thus, Hafiz Saeed, its leader was provided protection by the Pakistani state despite being designated as an international terrorist by the UN.
A Pakistani anti-terrorism court finally sentenced Saeed to 11 years in prison in February, 2020 for terror financing activities.
It sentenced him to stave off the global anti-terror watchdog, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), blacklisting Pakistan as terror financing state.
What is the difference between LeT and JeM?
Both the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have been engaged in attacks on Indian targets identified by Pakistan’s ISI.
The JeM has not hesitated to launch terrorist attacks on targets within Pakistan as well, especially against the Shias and Sufi shrines.
The difference between LeT and JeM is that the LeT is more pragmatic and less ideological but the JeM is highly ideological and sectarian.
JeM - JeM draws its ideological inspiration from extreme form of Deobandi Puritanism.
Deobandi Puritanism considers all those who do not believe in its philosophy beyond the pale of Islam.
Therefore, legitimate targets of attack for JeM include not only Shias and Barelvis but also the Pakistani state and the Pakistani military.
LeT - It does not consider Muslims of different theological orientations as non-believers.
This relatively “liberal” interpretation is due to the fact that LeT draws its ideological inspiration from a minority sect called Ahl-e-Hadis.
[Ahl-e-Hadis composes only a small proportion of Pakistan’s Muslim population and cannot afford to engage in sectarian conflict.]
Moreover, it draws its membership from different Muslim sects.
Both these factors drive LeT toward greater tolerance in sectarian terms and to avoid intra-Islamic theological battles.
Its primary goals are political and driving India out of Kashmir.
This jells well with the objectives of the Pakistani military and makes LeT and Hafiz Saeed, favourites of the Pakistani establishment.
What does this narrative clarify?
Many of the terrorist groups were deliberately created by the Pakistani state to serve its purposes.
However, its ability to control the various terrorist outfits is uneven and some of them have turned against their creator.
It establishes the fact that using terrorist outfits for state objectives can have very negative consequences for the stability of the state itself.
