India-Japan Defence Partnership

Why in News?

The changing security environment in Asia is compelling India and Japan to reassess the scale and ambition of their defence partnership.

What is the background?

• Rise of China – The principal driver of Japan's evolving defence policy is the rise of China as a major military power.
• Beijing's growing military capabilities and willingness to alter the status quo have created common security concerns for India and Japan.
  • Concerns of Japan – Japan faces Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea and around the Senkaku Islands.
  • Concerns of India – India faces persistent Chinese military pressure along the Himalayan border.
• Both countries confront a strategy involving persistent probing and gradual attempts to alter the territorial status quo.
• Thus, although India's geographical challenge is primarily continental while Japan's is predominantly maritime, both are responding to the broader transformation of the Asian balance of power.
• The American Factor – India and Japan continue to value the American presence in the Indo-Pacific.
• Japan remains closely tied to the United States through its alliance, while India considers American engagement important for maintaining a stable regional balance.
• However, changing American policies have generated questions regarding the predictability and long-term reliability of US regional commitments.
• This creates an incentive for India and Japan to strengthen their own national capabilities and develop stronger partnerships with other like-minded countries.
• Consequently, the objective is not to replace the United States but to develop greater regional capacity and strategic resilience.
• Japan's Strategic Transformation – For much of the post-war period, Japan followed a model in which economic development was prioritised while national security depended heavily on the US alliance.
• Defence expenditure remained relatively low, arms exports were heavily restricted and the Self-Defense Forces operated under significant political constraints.

• However, China's growing military capabilities gradually challenged this model. Under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan began a major transformation of its security policy.
• The 2022 defence reforms represented a significant milestone.
• Japan has sought to do the following:
  • Increase defence expenditure towards approximately 2% of GDP;
  • Acquire long-range counterstrike capabilities;
  • Strengthen air and missile defence;
  • Expand cyber and space capabilities;
  • Develop unmanned systems;
  • Enhance the ability of its forces to operate beyond the Japanese islands; and
  • Revitalise its domestic defence industrial base.
• Japan has also relaxed earlier restrictions on defence exports and introduced the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework to provide security-related assistance to friendly countries.
• Thus, Japan is increasingly treating military power, defence technology, arms exports and security assistance as instruments of statecraft.

What is the status of India-Japan Defence Cooperation?

• Existing Foundations – India and Japan already possess substantial institutional foundations for deeper cooperation.
  • The 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue;
  • A logistics support agreement;
  • Regular military exercises;
  • Cooperation among the three armed forces;
  • Maritime security cooperation; and
  • Growing defence technology engagement.
• The two countries have also increased cooperation in the maritime domain, particularly through exercises and efforts to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
• Recent developments – The announcement of a bilateral defence co-development project involving the UNICORN naval communications antenna is an important step towards technological cooperation.
• However, institutional mechanisms alone are insufficient.
• The real challenge is converting them into deployable capabilities and sustained defence-industrial outcomes.

• The Australia-Japan Model – Japan's expanding defence relationship with Australia demonstrates what a more ambitious partnership can achieve.
• Tokyo and Canberra have expanded:
  • Military exercises;
  • Reciprocal access arrangements;
  • Logistics cooperation;
  • Defence-industrial collaboration; and
  • Acquisition of Japanese defence platforms.
• Australia's decision to acquire Japanese-designed Mogami-class frigates represents an important breakthrough in Japan's evolution as a defence exporter.
• For India, this demonstrates the possibilities of moving beyond dialogue and exercises towards joint procurement, co-development and co-production.

What are the key challenges in India-Japan defense cooperation?

• Limited Defence Industrial Cooperation – India and Japan need greater ambition in joint research, development and production of defence technologies.
• Bureaucratic procedures, differing procurement systems and limited private-sector integration have constrained progress.
• Exercises Need Greater Operational Depth – Regular exercises are valuable, but the relationship should move towards more sophisticated operational coordination.
• Priority areas could include:
  • anti-submarine warfare;
  • maritime surveillance;
  • air defence;
  • logistics and replenishment;
  • unmanned systems;
  • cyber and space security; and
  • intelligence and information sharing.
• Technology Cooperation – Both countries possess complementary technological strengths.
• Japan's advanced manufacturing capabilities and India's growing technological and industrial base can support joint development in areas such as sensors, robotics, communications, unmanned systems and maritime technologies.
• Defence Supply-Chain Resilience – Greater India-Japan cooperation can reduce excessive dependence on single-country supply chains and contribute to resilient defence production networks across the Indo-Pacific.

What could be done?

• Production of defence system – the two countries should establish ambitious targets for joint development and co-production of defence systems.
• Streamlining military exercises – Second, military exercises should increasingly simulate realistic operational scenarios, particularly in the maritime domain.
• Data sharing – Both sides should strengthen information-sharing and maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
• Private sector participation – Greater private-sector participation should be encouraged to accelerate innovation and overcome bureaucratic delays.
• Expanding Cooperation – India and Japan should deepen trilateral and minilateral cooperation with Australia, the United States, South Korea and other like-minded Indo-Pacific partners.
• Cooperation should remain focused on maintaining a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific, rather than becoming a narrowly China-centric military arrangement.

Conclusion

• The transformation of Japan's defence policy presents India with a significant strategic opportunity.
• Japan is moving beyond its traditional post-war military restraint and developing stronger capabilities, defence technologies and security partnerships.
• For India, a stronger Japan is strategically advantageous.
• Both countries face common concerns regarding unilateral attempts to alter the regional status quo, while both have an interest in preserving a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
• The next phase of India-Japan relations must therefore move from political convergence to operational capability, from exercises to interoperability, and from defence trade to co-development and co-production.
• A more capable India-Japan defence partnership can strengthen not only bilateral security but also the broader balance of power and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Reference

The Indian Express| Indian Japan Defence Partnership