Pakistan’s Arm Diplomacy

Why in News?

Recently, Pakistan has reportedly finalised a deal to supply Pakistani arms worth $4.6 billion – the largest such deal ever by Islamabad – to the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

What are Pakistan’s significant defence export agreements?

• Historic Arms Deal with Libya – The deal includes 16 JF-17 fighter jets(built in Pakistan with Chinese assistance, a Russian engine & some Turkish missiles) and 12 Super Mushak trainers over 30 months.
• Some reports indicate that the deal is being funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has long supported Haftar.
• Negotiations with Sudan – Pakistan is negotiating a $1.5–4 billion worth of defence equipment deal with Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF).
• Package may include Karakorum-8 aircraft, drones, advanced air defence systems, and JF-17 fighter jets.
• There are hints that Saudi Arabia may finance this transfer through loan waivers.
• Diplomatic Boosts – Recent developments has enabled Pakistan to accelerate its defence exports, such as
  • Claimed successes in May 2025 India‑Pakistan conflict,
  • Trump’s White House welcome for Gen. Asim Munir,
  • Signing of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia,
  • UAE President’s visit to Islamabad.
• Expanding Export Footprint – Pakistan claims to have supplied JF-17s to Azerbaijan, Myanmar, Nigeria & Bangladesh.
• If Pakistan’s claimed and potential deals are cumulated, they reach $13 billion.

What factors could limit or weaken Pakistan’s arms push?

• Production Capacity – Pakistan’s capacity to produce the JF-17 is limited to about 25 units/year, shared between domestic requirements and exports.
• Industrial Dependence – Lacking an industrial base of its own, it largely assembles these fighters from foreign-sourced components (China, Russia, Turkey), creating dependencies.
• Financing Fragility – The transactions are often made to recipients dependent on third-party financing, a pinch point.
• That is, the buyers (Libya, Sudan) rely on third‑party Gulf financing (UAE, Saudi Arabia).
• Legal & Geopolitical issues – Both Libya and Sudan are currently under United Nations arms embargoes, and the two megadeals are buffeted by the Saudi-UAE rivalry, making balancing alliances tricky.
• The possibility of supplying Pakistani arms to RSF (supported by the UAE), meaning both Sudanese factions could be using its weapons.
• Quality & Reputation – The hype about the combat-proven JF‑17s success against India may eventually wear out, revealing shoddy, incompetent products, and result in a reversal.
• U.S. Factor – Munir’s close ties with Trump could be both helpful and risky - Trump may support his deals but oppose him channeling Chinese weapons into a region Washington sees as its own.

How has the approach to Gulf security changed, and what benefits has Pakistan gained?

• Past & Current approach – Washington often relied on Pakistan to manage Gulf security, effectively subcontracting the role.
• The current episode seemed different, with the Gulf monarchies using the same subcontractor to fortify their respective regional proxies, rather than depending on U.S. direction.
• Gains for Rawalpindi – Pakistan’s military headquarters (GHQ Rawalpindi) benefits by gets hard cash, earns brownie points from the cash-rich Gulf monarchies and expands its outreach to regional hotspots for future security aggregation.
• Changed Role – Unlike in the past, Pakistanis are only supplying hardware and training, without putting boots on the ground.

What issues should India be concerned about regarding Pakistan?

• Pakistan’s Expanding Role – Pakistan is emerging as a net security provider to the Gulf and beyond should concern New Delhi.
• This challenges India, which has deeper economic ties with the Gulf but less defence leverage.
• Strategic challenge – Pakistan’s success in forging a regional security and defence role would be a force multiplier, enabling it to reclaim parity with India in that region & position itself as a military‑industrial hub.
• Image Makeover – The Gulf’s security dependence on Pakistan helps Islamabad shed its reputation for terrorism, dodgy financial practices and drug running, earning it recognitions from Beijing and Washington.
• All these developments may embolden Rawalpindi to revive terrorism in India, notwithstanding New Delhi’s threat of retaliation, while spinning false narratives of military success.
• Defence Economics – Pakistan’s economy and manufacturing are far smaller than India’s (one‑tenth and one‑thirteenth).
• Yet, through joint ventures with China and Türkiye, its annual defence production has reached $7 billion, compared to India’s $18 billion.
• Its sales pitch has been sophisticated and multi-pronged – leveraging Islamic solidarity, military-to-military links, and aggressive pricing.
• Integrated Approach – Unlike India, Pakistan’s defence exports and military establishment do not work in silos.
• Examples – Gen. Munir personally visited Benghazi to finalize the Libya deal, PAF chief led talks with Saudi Arabia and Sudan, Islamabad supplied $400 million of ammunition to Ukraine.
• Despite moral/legal concerns, Rawalpindi pursues these deals single‑mindedly.
• Strategic Tilt – Pakistan’s gains may not be India’s loss in material terms, but these, nevertheless, tilt the geopolitics in its favour.

What steps must India pursue?

• India’s Current Position – Defence exports have grown to $2.8 billion (2024–25), Pakistan shows that rapid surges are possible with greater endeavour and passion.
• Not replicate Pakistan – As a more responsible and self-respecting country adhering to international law, India cannot replicate Pakistani tactics.
• Yet, India can leverage its indigenous defence industry more effectively for exports.
• Strategic Priorities – India should prioritise defence exports for their financial and political spin-offs, focusing particularly on its friends in the neighbourhood and the Global South.
• As the world’s third-largest crude importer, India can leverage its buying power to persuade its oil suppliers to redress the huge trade imbalance by procuring Indian weapon systems.
• Financing Tools – India has sizable aid programmes and credit lines with several countries, which could be utilised to lubricate such arms deals.
• Institutional Reform – India could create a dedicated defence export promotion organisation embedded with the stakeholders concerned, such as the public/private defence producers, IT & AI experts, ministries, and funding institutions.
• Such an organisation should aggressively market its defence products at various international exhibitions & bilateral events.
• Should be empowered to negotiate and conclude deals autonomously with minimum bureaucratic controls.
• Closing the Gap – India is currently the world’s second-largest arms importer and ranks low among the top 25 defence exporters.
• This gap needs to be bridged to tilt the defence trade balance in India’s favour.

Reference

The Hindu | Pakistan’s arms sales drive calls for India’s attention