

Significance of the NBFC Sector

What is the issue?

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The significance of non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) calls for measures to revive the sector, in the backdrop of the recent crisis.

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How did NBFCs evolve?

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- There were days when moneylenders were charging exorbitant interest rates and dictating terms to the borrower.
- Unlicensed moneylenders used to inhabit the rural neighbourhood without any regulation, leading to pricing inefficiencies.
- Eventually, chit fund companies (regulated by states) and Nidhi companies (regulated by Ministry of Commerce) came up.
- For the past decade or so, this space had been occupied by the RBI-regulated non-banking financial companies (NBFCs).
- **NBFC** An NBFC is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956.
- It engages in the business of \n

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- i. loans and advances
- ii. acquisition of shares/stocks/bonds/debentures/securities issued by Government or local authority or other marketable securities of a like nature \n
- $_{\text{iii.}}$ leasing, hire-purchase, insurance business, chit business, etc

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 \bullet It, however, does not include any institution whose principal business is that of -

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i. agriculture activity

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ii. industrial activity

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 ${\it iii.}$ purchase or sale of any goods (other than securities)

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iv. providing any services and sale/purchase/construction of immovable property \n

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• NBFCs largely depend on market based funds.

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 \bullet They aim at bridging the gap in pricing inefficiency based on perceived risk. $\ensuremath{\backslash} n$

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• **Now** - As of March 2018, there were 11,402 NBFCs registered with the RBI, of which 156 were deposit accepting (NBFCs-D).

• There were 249 systemically important non-deposit accepting NBFCs (NBFCs ND-SI).

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- The aggregate balance sheet size of the NBFC sector as on March 2018 was Rs 22.1 trillion (around 15% of the banking system balance sheet size).
- The financial performance of NBFCs-D has been quite impressive.
- Their assets size has increased by 21.8% (CAGR compound annual growth rate) in five years.

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• Their loans and advances have increased by 27.7% (five-year CAGR).

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What is the recent crisis?

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• India has been witnessing a huge surge in consumer leverage in recent years.

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• The non-bank intermediaries i.e. NBFCs have been growing this lending faster than banks.

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- \bullet In this backdrop, the $\underline{\text{IL\&FS}}$ first defaulted on its obligations, drawing attention of the economic analysts.
- \bullet Eventually, fund house DSP group offloaded Rs 200-300 crore worth of commercial papers of housing finance company DHFL at higher yields. \n
- These sparked fears among the investors, and rumours spread about a systemic liquidity problem in the NBFC space.
- From then on, NBFC stocks have been on a free fall. $\$
- A kind of contagion then spread to other financial stocks, and the benchmark indices crashed, creating wider impacts.
- Following the credit crunch after IL&FS crisis, RBI provided <u>special</u> <u>incentives</u> to banks to enable the flow of funds to NBFCs.

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Why is the NBFC sector significant?

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- Certainly, the contribution of NBFCs is key to India's growth.
- These companies played a critical role in the core development of infrastructure, transport, and employment generation.
- \bullet It also contributed to wealth creation opportunities and financial support for economically weaker sections. $\ensuremath{\backslash} n$

• NBFCs also make a huge contribution to the state exchequer.

- Significantly, NBFCs provide an alternative source of funding and liquidity.
- Non-bank entities with specialised expertise provide an alternative source of

credit and certain functions in the credit intermediation chain more cost-efficiently.

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• As such, NBFCs represent a unique success story in financial innovation and last mile connectivity.

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• **Crisis** - Following the crisis, the NBFC sector was compared with shadow banking in India.

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- However, it might be immature to draw such a comparison.
- \bullet Evidently, the size of the NBFC sector in India is around \$0.4 trillion with a share of only 0.9% in the global shadow banking space. \n
- \bullet In contrast, in China it has expanded to at least a \$7 trillion business involving financial institutions. $\ensuremath{\backslash} n$
- Even in small jurisdictions such as Cayman Islands and Luxembourg the size of shadow banks is much larger than that in India.
- NBFCs in India are also RBI-/SEBI-regulated.
- \bullet The RBI has been quite far sighted in slowly migrating NBFCs to a Basel-like prudential regime structure. $\mbox{\sc NB}$

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What lies ahead?

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- NBFCs still are a valuable alternative and can hardly be ignored.
- So it is imperative that NBFCs are supported and the financial system is kept with adequate liquidity.

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- A combination of mid-course corrections by NBFCs themselves and regulatory changes could be effective.
- Some of the investment and small finance companies have a large fixed asset base (including capital work in progress).
- But finance companies need to be asset light so that they can improve their return on equity (RoE).

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• So asset heavy companies that have low yielding assets may now pursue an asset light model.

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 \bullet In fact, emphasis on consolidated numbers (below) remain key factors from a stakeholder's perspective:

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i. financials

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ii. quality of receivables

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iii. return on equity (RoE)

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iv. cash flow from operations

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v. portfolio mix

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vi. asset and liability management (ALM)

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 \bullet ALM needs to be straightened and a holistic touch in sub-sectors such as housing finance could be an ideal regulatory intervention. \n

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Source: Economic Times, Business Standard

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