

# **India's West Asia policy**

### Why in news?

 $n\n$ 

\n

• In November, India held its first joint commission meeting with the Palestinian Authority and this week will send a representative to a Paris meeting on reviving the West Asia peace process.

 $n\n$ 

### Are these moves mean something?

 $n\n$ 

\n

- None of this is path-breaking and still a far cry from the pre-1990 days when India was a vociferous supporter of the Palestinian cause.
- But there are reasons India is considering tentative steps in this direction.

 $n\n$ 

#### What are the reasons?

 $n\n$ 

\n

- One, the transformation of relations between India and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar a few steps behind, has meant the present government is beginning to shape what its officials call a "greater West Asia" policy.
- Besides some standard diplomatic and economic interests, India probably sees an opportunity to reduce Pakistan's standing in a part of the world from which it has long received blind support.
- Two, Modi is personally a source of suspicion across much of the Arab and Muslim world thanks to the shadow of the 2002 Gujarat riots.
- Part of New Delhi's problem is that it is increasingly hard to find Arab

**interlocutors** it is comfortable with. There are few functional examples of the secular, if largely undemocratic, Arab political parties or movements that India has traditionally preferred.

۱'n

- $\bullet$  Three, India is likely to further expand its relationship with Israel.  $\ensuremath{^{\backslash n}}$
- Already the larger importer of Israeli arms in the world, India now has a security relationship that extends to the most sensitive defence areas like nuclear weapons technology and doctrine.
- $\bullet$  Modi's additional interest in the relationship is water. Israel is the acknowledged world leader in this area and the PM wants this to be a new pillar in the relationship. \n

\n\n

### Do the renewed Palestine interest help India?

 $n\n$ 

\n

- New Delhi knows that as it becomes closer to Tel Aviv there is an inevitable blowback in the Arab world. Showing renewed interest in Palestine is a useful means to help counter this.
- New Delhi has used support for Palestinian nationalism as a foil to counter criticism of its shift to Tel Aviv for decades.

\n

• Interestingly, in the joint commission meeting the Palestinians said they were pleased to talk to India because of its presumed influence on the Israelis.

\n

 $n\n$ 

## Will we involve in West Asian peace process?

 $n\n$ 

\n

• New Delhi has **no interest in getting directly involved** in the West Asian peace process. It has neither the means and interest nor the diplomatic heft to do so.

\n

• And arguably there could be no worse time to do so than now — when polls show that support for a two-nation solution is at its lowest point among both

Israelis and Palestinians.

۱n

 That the cause is being suddenly picked up by the lamest of lame duck governments — Ex. The outgoing Barack Obama — is a sign what the international community actually thinks about its prospects.

 $n\$ 

#### **Conclusion:**

 $n\n$ 

۱n

- India has other problems. One of them is **its refusal to deal with Hamas**, the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, because of its dislike for non-secular Islamic groups. But to talk Palestine without Hamas is like speaking a language without vowels.
- None of this will matter for now. New Delhi's interest in Palestine is about issues other than Palestine itself.
- As is true for much of the world. India's proposal to build an infotech park in Gaza may be the most important and tangible contribution it can make to the Palestinians.

\n

 $n\n$ 

 $n\n$ 

Category: Mains | GS - II | Bilateral Relations

 $n\n$ 

**Source: Hindustan Times** 

\n

