

Flaws in IBC

What is the issue?

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- The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 was enacted with the intention of improving the **ease of doing business** in India \n
- The code is however said to have certain loopholes that goes against this principle.

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What is IBC?

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- It aims to overhaul laws relating to reorganisation and **insolvency resolution** of corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals.
- It attempts to ease the process of recovery of money by operational and financial creditors in a timely manner. \n
- It places the onus on professionals to put forth the resolution plans. \n

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How does it operate?

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• When a firm defaults on its debt, its control will shift to a **committee of creditors.**

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- The committee will have 180 days to evaluate the proposals from various interested parties on how to either revive the company or enable liquidation. \n
- The code has provisions for the creation of 'Insolvency Professionals' who

would handle the commercial aspects of the resolution process.

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- Insolvency professional agencies will train and regulate these professionals. \n
- The Debt Recovery Tribunal act as adjudicating authorities for individuals and unlimited partnership firms, and National Company Law Tribunal would deal with companies and limited liability entities.
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India will be the overall regulator. \n

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What are the shortcomings?

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• The code fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect the rights of the company before handing over the management to the resolution professional.

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- The Code rides substantially on the unquestionable word of the creditors. \n
- The Code fails to provide any opportunity to the corporate debtor to make a representation at any stage of the resolution process.
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- The Code is also deficient in providing criteria for the qualification of the interim and of the final insolvency resolution professionals. \n
- It allows for any person to access the information memorandum put together by the insolvency professional without restricting competitors or imposing any **confidentiality obligations**.

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- This goes against the right to business. $\slash n$
- The Code fails to define a resolution applicant. All such **resolution plans** are placed before the financial creditors and is implemented by way of an order by the NCLT.

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- If the financial creditors fail to arrive at a consensus, the default plan is to liquidate the company. $\$
- The Code prohibits withdrawal of the application once it has been admitted.

This means that there is no scope for settlement.

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What could be done?

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- The code must be robust, decentralized, less costly, inclusive and speedy. $\ensuremath{\sc vn}$
- This would help businesses exit sooner and capital to be redeployed faster to productive firms, thereby improving economic output and employment. \n
- The code should encourage decentralization, reduce the role of courts or insolvency professionals and allow for a greater role for a market-friendly approach.

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Source: The Hindu

